Adjustment and Hybridity in Turkish Family Change: Perspectives from Developmental Idealism

Introduction

This paper brings together the developmental idealism framework for understanding family behavior and change with Turkey’s more than two hundred year efforts to modernize its social and economic systems. Developmental idealism is a value and belief system that grew out of the centuries-old models of developmentalism or modernization theory (Thornton 2001, 2005). The basic messages of developmental idealism are that a modern society is good and should be sought after, that modern families are good and should be emulated, that modern families are both causes and consequences of modern societies, and that freedom and equality are fundamental human rights. The messages of developmental idealism emerged in the West and have been disseminated around the world over the last two centuries. As developmental idealism has spread internationally, it has come into contact with local belief and value systems and social and economic structures. Frequently, the contact between developmental idealism and local belief and value systems has produced clashes of cultural systems and resistance to developmental idealism messages. Because of the power and legitimacy of developmental idealism and its supporters, developmental idealism often brings long-term changes that can be described as a hybridization of developmental idealism with local cultures.

The developmental idealism framework is useful for understanding family change, continuity, and hybridization in Turkey during the past two centuries because many influential Turks adopted the ideas of modernization and have worked to spread and implement them in Turkey. When the Republican government came to power in 1923, it explicitly adopted modernization as a guiding principle and set out to develop the country. Such efforts have continued, although in modified form, with Turkey’s efforts to enter the European Union. We argue that these modernization campaigns adopted the essentials of
developmental idealism as public doctrine and policy and tried to implement them in the military, industrialization, school expansion, social customs and etiquette, family structure, and demographic practice. They were met at varying times and in different places with resistance, with clashes of cultures being common within the country.

During the last century there have been many changes in Turkish demographic and family behavior and relationships. These include increases in age at marriage, declines in fertility, increases in divorce, more egalitarianism in gender roles, and more independence among young people. We argue that the modernization programs of Turkey and their adoption of the belief and value system of developmental idealism have played important roles in these family changes. In this paper we show how developmental idealism is an important part of Turkey’s family and demographic change. We explain how it has been an important force and discuss how it has interacted with structural forces in bringing family and demographic change. We show how the ideas of developmental idealism have combined with historical Turkish culture to modify and hybridize family life. Thus, our paper is a case study of how developmental idealism has influenced family change and continuity in one country, but with implications for understanding the possible influence of developmental idealism in other places.

We begin our argument with a discussion of family and demographic behavior as it existed in Turkey’s past. Our purpose is not to provide new information about past family life in Turkey, but to use the existing literature to set the stage for understanding how developmental idealism helped to change this historical family system. Then we discuss the ideas underpinning developmental idealism, with the purpose of showing how developmental idealism contrasts with the historical family and demographic system of Turkey. We also discuss mechanisms for the dissemination of developmental idealism both from the West to Turkey and within Turkey itself. The next part of our argument addresses the Turkish modernization programs of the last two centuries and how they promulgated the messages of developmental idealism. Finally, we discuss how these programs have been followed by extensive change, continuity, and hybridization in family and demographic behavior in Turkey. We discuss present
day family life in Turkey, which is imbued with both continuity and change that are manifested in a mixture of old and new family patterns. As with our discussion of historical Turkish patterns, our goal here is not to provide new information about current family patterns, but to show how those patterns represent a hybridization or mixture between old and new family forms. We also discuss tensions that have existed between the old and new forms.

Our argument is that developmental idealism has been an important force changing Turkey’s family culture. We posit that developmental idealism has operated through many mechanisms. Of particular importance is that a desire for a modern society led Turkey’s elite to advocate for and initiate modern societal innovations. This included the expansion of educational institutions, the incorporation of many aspects of Western culture into school curriculums, and creation of mass media outlets. Also, important were drives to industrialize the country, which led to economic expansion and urbanization. Such changes may have helped to foster family change, as they modified the modes of production, the place of the family in the economy, the diversity of social networks, and the need for different skills with implications for marriage, divorce, childbearing, sex roles, and intergenerational relations. Such changes could also have modified family beliefs and values that, in turn, changed family behavior. As well, these changes served as mechanisms for the spread of the messages of developmental idealism. The effort to modernize Turkey also sought to implement developmental idealism directly through campaigns, speeches, educational programs, and legal reforms that were likely to have permeated to the grassroots and ordinary people over many decades.

This conceptualization of developmental idealism and its place in Turkish society dramatically alters the causal structure usually conceived by demographers and other social scientists in that it places beliefs and values in the role of exogenous forces rather than products of other forces posited as exogenous. In many ways it was a commitment to the modernization program that brought to Turkey schools, factories, urbanization, income growth, mass media and new forms of family life. In addition, the new institutions created by developmental idealism formed important pathways for the further spread of
developmental idealism—all with implications for family behavior. Understanding this exogenous role of developmental idealism, we argue, is crucial for understanding family change and continuity in Turkey.

As we argue below, the change and continuity in Turkey have resulted in the coexistence of indigenous and Western practices in people’s families. As Thornton (2005; p.239), states “any adoption of developmental idealism, involves considerable mixing of indigenous family forms and those of developmental idealism into a hybrid family system”. This is true in the Turkish case, as the joint occurrence of traditional (e.g., non-Western) and modern (e.g., Western) elements are evident and lead to a hybrid or mixed structure that manifests itself in the lives of people. In fact, Turkey provides an interesting case where Western and indigenous family patterns coexist (Aykan & Wolf, 2000).

Any paper that attempts to apply a theoretical framework to two hundred years of any country’s history will, of course, have limitations. The causal story begins in the West with developmental idealism that is both exported and imported into Turkey at national, aggregate, and elite levels and then is transmitted to communities and individuals through various mechanisms. We discuss some of the multifaceted and complex dissemination mechanisms for the spread of developmental idealism from the West to Turkey and from the national level to the grassroots.

Unfortunately, data limitations are particularly vexing, as we do not have the necessary information to track precisely the various pathways for disseminating developmental idealism. That is, we cannot document which mechanisms were operating most strongly during which periods. Also, unfortunately in Turkey we do not have long-term data to document changes in people’s values and beliefs concerning developmental idealism. Thus, our discussion of the modernization efforts is primarily limited to speeches, popular literature, and legal reforms. Our discussion of changes, continuity, and hybridization of behavior is limited to vital statistics and other demographic data, along with individual studies with limited temporal depth. Thus, we cannot document in detail how doctrinal, policy, and
programmatic efforts at the governmental levels were translated into changes and continuity in people’s family values, beliefs, and behavior. Despite our inability to document empirically all the elements in the argument, we believe that our argument shows how developmental idealism is an important factor that should be taken into account in understanding and explaining long-term family and demographic change in Turkey. In doing so, we provide new insights into how an ideational system can be an important exogenous force for substantial change.

Our emphasis on developmental idealism does not mean that we believe that it is the only force for family change and that material and economic forces and other ideational elements have had no important influence on family change in Turkey. We know that explanations of family changes must be multi-causal and we recognize that such factors as urbanization, industrialization, rural-to-urban migration, and increasing education have been widely emphasized as forces causing family change in Turkey (e.g., Aytaç, 1998; Vergin, 1985; Ataca & Sunar, 1999; Aykan & Wolf, 2000). Although such economic and material factors have long been emphasized as influences on family and demographic trends, recent research has shown that economic and material factors alone cannot explain such trends. This has led demographers and other scholars to increase the attention they pay to ideational factors in explaining family change (Cherlin 1992; Chesnais 1992; Cleland and Wilson 1987; Coale and Watkins 1986; Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002; Lesthaeghe 2010; Van de Kaa 1996). Our paper is one such effort to consider ideational factors. We also expand the argument by suggesting that ideas can be influential in changing such things as educational expansion and industrialization that are often used to explain family change.

Note that we are not endorsing or rejecting the beliefs and values of either historical Turkish culture or developmental idealism. Instead, our aim is to understand how developmental idealism has mixed together with historical Turkish patterns to affect people’s family behaviors.
The Turkish Family System in the Past

We begin our discussion of Turkish families in the past with the understanding that the beliefs and values contained in culture help people understand the world and how it functions. Values and beliefs indicate what is good and to be sought after and inform people about proper means to achieve goals (Geertz 1973; Fricke 1997). A cultural model can be quite dominant within an individual or community. Multiple schemas can exist at the same time in mutually reinforcing or antagonistic ways, and they can change over time.

For thousands of years each society has had its own culture providing it models to understand the world and its functioning. These society-specific cultures have also provided schemas that outline appropriate behavior and relationships. They provide guidance, sometimes even rules, for marriage, marital dissolution, childbearing, sex roles, and intergenerational relations.

Being at the intersection of Asia and Europe, Anatolia has been the center of several different ethnic and religious populations, each with its own cultural system. The Ottoman Empire that reigned over the region for six centuries allowed these diverse populations to maintain their cultures, family systems, and religions, resulting in diverse and heterogeneous family systems and laws. It was due to this diversity that numerous attempts to bring uniform marriage, divorce, and inheritance codes were never implemented successfully (Ortayli, 1994). This high variability as well as lack of available data, specifically on the non-Muslim community, makes it difficult to establish a single description of the family in the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, when we talk about Turkish families existing historically, we are referring to the Muslim community in the Empire from the 19th century onward.

The evidence suggests that the Ottoman Empire historically had both nuclear families and different forms of extended families. In rural Anatolia the father had the responsibility to provide homes either under the same roof or in very close proximity (Duben, 1990). In one extended family form, a newly-wed couple resided in a household with an older couple who were usually the husband’s parents. This kind of household was often a temporary arrangement, as the household divided when the young couple was able to set up their own household or the elderly parents, usually the father died. A common
pattern was thus for a newlywed couple to first live with the husband’s parents, later form their own households, and then again live with the husband’s parents when the parents became elderly (Özbay, 1984).

In another form of the extended family, a modified extended version, families lived together in different houses in the same yard rather than under the same roof. This family form embedded both nuclear and extended aspects; it was nuclear in that people had their own space to sleep; yet it was joint in that people ate together. This was found in rural areas and among the wealthy in urban areas where some family members lived in big apartment buildings, with each household having its own apartment yet sharing the same kitchen (Vergin, 1985; Ortaylı, 1994; Duben, 1990).

Marriage occurred at an early age, 14-18 years for women and 20-22 for men, (Duben, 1990). Endogamy and preferential marriage with the paternal uncle's daughter existed but were not frequent (Vergin, 1985). People married through religious wedlock officiated by the imam (religious leader) of the local mosque. The marriage payment (mehr) was an integral part of the Islamic marriage contract. It was paid directly to the bride by the groom or his family, and it legally belonged to her (Vergin, 1985). The customary bride wealth, başlık, was another form of marriage payment, unlike mehr, to the bride’s father (Vergin, 1985). It was more common in rural Anatolia and “valued as a symbol of chastity and for the economic gains it brings in exchange for the loss of labor of the girl” (Kağıtçıbaşi, 1982).

Respect for age and authority has long been an important family value in Turkey, both in rural and urban settings. Polygyny was accepted, but it was neither prevalent nor a norm, with only a few urban rich practicing it. Divorce existed but was practiced only as a last resort. Moreover, divorce at the request of the wife has long been an accepted practice. Fertility was high and the use of contraception rare. As recently as the 1930s, the total fertility rate was around 7 children per woman.

**Developmental Idealism**

Developmental idealism is a cultural package that contrasts sharply with historical Turkish culture. It is a set of beliefs and values produced in the West by generations of social scientists and policy
elites that provides understanding of the world and models for living in the world. Developmental idealism grows out of a modernization model that suggests that modernity is desirable and should be sought after. It also indicates how to attain a modern society. We argue that developmental idealism was a part of the Turkish modernization project and played a central role in societal and family change.

The modernization or development model that developmental idealism is based on has been dominant among scholars and policy elites for hundreds of years. However, we do not discuss the modernization model because we believe it to be an appropriate model for understanding people’s behavior and social change, but because it lays the foundation for understanding the power of developmental idealism. In fact, the modernization model has been heavily criticized in academia in recent decades because, among other reasons, it is teleological and its assumptions are unsustainable. (Mandelbaum, 1971; Nisbet, 1976, 1969; Wallerstein, 1991; Chakrabarty, 2000).

Despite these criticisms, the modernization model is widely accepted internationally within governments and non-governmental organizations, including major world bodies such as the United Nations (Krücken & Drori, 2009; Latham, 2000; Meyer et al., 1997). Ethnographic and historical studies outside Turkey have shown the ideas of modernization to be extensive among ordinary people in many settings (Dahl & Rabo, 1992; Deeb, 2006; Pigg, 1992; Abu-Lughod, 1998). Survey data from outside Turkey also indicate that ordinary people in several settings understand and endorse many aspects of development models (Binstock & Thornton, 2007; Thornton, Binstock, & Ghimire, 2008). It is this widespread dissemination of the modernization model, and its influence on family and demographic behavior rather than a belief in modernization, that motivates our discussion of the model for Turkey.

The modernization model provides a picture of social change held by much of Western thinking from the Enlightenment of the 1700s to the present. The model depicts change as uniform, natural, and directional and assumes that all societies are on the same trajectory and going through the same stages from traditional to modern, from backward to civilized, with the speed of movement varying across societies (Thornton, 2005). Because of ethnocentrism and the political and economic ascendancy of the
West, Western scholars deemed northwest Europe as the most advanced and placed societies seen as culturally distant from northwest Europe at the lower end of this development ladder, and scattered other societies between high and low development.

For hundreds of years scholars have observed that while variations in family patterns existed both within the West and within and between other regions, families in northwest Europe were different than those in many non-Western countries. The characteristics of non-Western families were described as traditional or less modern and included family solidarity, extended households, polygyny, young and universal marriage, extensive parental authority, lack of affection before marriage, high fertility, and low regard for women’s autonomy. The attributes of northwest European families were characterized as modern or developed and included extensive individualism, nuclear households, monogamy, older and less universal marriage, youthful autonomy, marriages arranged predominantly by couples, affection before marriage, planned and low fertility, and high regard for women.

Scholars formulated theories suggesting causal relations between economic development and modern family patterns. Basically, the theory was that elements of a modern society such as urbanization, wealth, education, and technology were primary causal forces producing the elements of a modern family. Some also believed that modern families helped to cause a modern society. These developmental theories became a cultural belief and value system that provided guidance and models for people to live in the world and to change their perceptions, goals, and behaviors. We follow Thornton (2001, 2005) in calling these new cultural models developmental idealism. Thornton (2001, 2005) has distilled the elements of developmental idealism concerning family life into four main cultural values and beliefs: (a) modern society is good and attainable; (b) the modern family is good and attainable; (c) a modern family is a cause and an effect of a modern society; and (d) individuals have the right to be free and equal and have their relationships based on consent. Adoption of any of these elements of developmental idealism would be powerful in encouraging embracement of Western family forms.
An important body of research has shown that many cultural ideas with their beginnings in the West have been disseminated widely in other parts of the world. These include the cultural elements of a rational worldview, education, science, freedom, equality, and human rights (Krücken and Drori 2009; Meyer et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 1987). There have been many mechanisms for the international spread of developmental idealism and other cultural elements from the West. European travelers, family planning programs, democracy movements, feminist movements, national and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and international treaties and conventions have helped to distribute these ideas. Leaders in various countries have also sought out the ideas and social systems of Western modernity by sending students abroad to learn about modernity and how to implement it.

There are also important mechanisms for spreading developmental idealism within non-Western countries. These include the movement from rural agricultural societies to urban industrial ones, educational programs, the mass media, and direct governmental efforts to spread and implement the messages. Developmental idealism can also be spread through informal networks within communities and families. Developmental idealism can be spread because the ideas are persuasive or because governments and non-governmental organizations have the power, wealth, and interests to provide incentives and sanctions for people to adopt it (Luke & Watkins, 2002).

As we mentioned earlier, developmental idealism also plays a role in creating the social and economic mechanisms that disseminate it. That is, the desire to create a modern society—a central element in developmental idealism—fosters urbanization, industrialization, educational programs, the expansion of mass media, and government programs, which, in turn, help to spread developmental idealism. Consequently, the causal pathways between developmental idealism, material and economic change, and family and demographic change are complex and multi-faceted.

Developmental idealism has been a strong force for family change in many places during the past several centuries, propelling changes in living arrangements, marriage, divorce, gender relations, intergenerational relationships, and fertility (Thornton 2001, 2005; Thornton & Philipov, 2009; Binstock
& Thornton, 2007). It has provided an impetus for social policy and action both at governmental and individual levels in many parts of the world (Thornton, 2005). For example, the Chinese government’s efforts to raise age at marriage, reduce the number of children born, and weaken parental authority during the last part of the 20th century were done in large part in an effort to modernize the country.

Many of these considerations about the dissemination of developmental idealism and its influence on family change apply to Turkey. The modernity aspirations and projects of the Ottoman period since the 19th century, the Republican era as of 1923, and the present era endorsed many beliefs and values of developmental idealism. The belief that “modern society is good and attainable” was at the center of the Turkish reformers’ modernity vision. It motivated many institutional and organizational reforms in Turkey—such as schools, factories, and mass media—with important implications for family change. Also important to the reformers was the idea that modern families are good and can help bring modern society. There was also an important endorsement of freedom and equality. Inasmuch as these ideas constituted strong motivational forces that influenced the actions of leaders and the intelligentsia over several centuries, understanding of developmental idealism provides an overarching perspective to throw new light on family changes in Turkey. The developmental idealism perspective also helps us understand the opposition to and conflict about the modernity project and to understand how family behavior today is a hybridization of the old and new. It is beyond the scope of this paper to disentangle the effects of economic, material, and ideational influences on family change; rather our purpose is to show the relevance of developmental idealism for Turkey. We now discuss the Turkish modernization project and its relationship to the beliefs and values of developmental idealism.

**General Project of Modernity during the Late Ottoman and Republican Periods**

From the 19th century onward, many in Turkey have been motivated by the ideas of modernity and the desire to modernize the country. Such modernity efforts took many forms, including societal and familial. In this section, we talk about general efforts to change society, and in the following section we address efforts for family modernization.
Turkey’s reforms were highly motivated by the developmental idealism belief that a modern society is good and should be pursued. This motivated many efforts to make the military more like militaries in Europe, to expand education, to Westernize school curriculums, to industrialize the country and increase urbanization, and to foster more efficient communication and transportation systems. There were also extensive efforts to change the legal system, social customs, and etiquette. As a result of these societal modernization efforts, economic and material changes have been widespread in Turkey. It is often stated that, among the near eastern countries, Turkey has experienced the most rapid and substantial economic and social changes since the turn of the twentieth century (e.g., Ortayli, 1994; Aytaç, 1998; Aykan & Wolf, 2000).

As Ozdalga (2005) has written, “Turkey has at every stage in its more than 150 year encounter with modernity, perceived itself as lagging behind acknowledged Western standard”. The question of how the Empire could close the gap with the West in military, technology, and education concerned many political elites. Believing that the Ottoman Empire could be saved by integration into the Western political and economic system (Ahmad, 1993), many Ottoman elites saw the West as a model for solving the Empire’s stagnation. A reform movement started with training military officers in European methods. The Tanzimat (Restructuring) movement (1839-1876) and the subsequent reign of Abdulhamit II (1876–1909) brought additional political, administrative, and military reforms, as well as educational reforms that included the teaching of science and Western languages in secondary schools.

Many conservatives criticized the westernizing elites for aping the lifestyle of the West and estranging the country from its true culture. Nevertheless, the secularization and modernization movement extended to almost all aspects of life in the Empire. Nationalist intelligentsia who had both Ottoman and Western educations, knowledge of European languages, and contact with Western countries were the main reformers. Among these reformers were the Young Turks, consisting mostly of university students, who later formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and a revolutionary movement to establish parliamentary government. They published articles and manifestos advocating modernization of
the educational institutions, ways of thinking, and social and domestic mannerisms to be like those in the West. Listening to classical music, mastering French, interspersing French words in conversations, playing the piano, dancing at balls, and other Western practices were advocated and became indices of modern living among the urban upper class in the Empire (see Meric, 2000; Ozer, 2006; Mardin, 2006). Among many elites, Western modes of behavior came to be regarded as good and progressive whereas indigenous practices became despised as backward.

Such terms as *alla franca* (European) versus *alla turca* (Turkish) were used to designate Western and Ottoman practices. As Gole (1996; p.15) wrote, “*alla franca* behaviors were praised while everything associated with the *alla turca* mode acquires a negative meaning”. The magazines and newspapers of the period tried to educate the masses positively toward western practices. *Alla franca* recipes, table settings and manners, proper etiquette, childrearing patterns, and household designs appeared in magazines and newspapers with illustrations. One newspaper, for instance, described the *alla franca* way of life as the new life. The ‘new’ men reiterated in the following newspaper excerpt signify a transformed individual who adopts European manners in every sphere, including his eating manners:

New men eat their meal with great care; they don’t make any noise not even fork or spoon sound. They don’t talk at dinner table nor do they eat hastily. They don’t eat much bread and do not prefer fatty food, they follow the health advice of European health authorities... they don’t lie down on the cushions rather they sit on the backed-chairs and smoke their cigarette. (Resimli Gazete, 1924, quoted in Ozer 2006). (Author’s translation).

However, as our model predicts, many people were critical of Westernization and advocated retaining the core values, norms, and behavior of Ottoman society. This tension and intense ongoing debates between alla turca and alla franca supporters continued for decades. The following comment about listening to Turkish classical music as opposed to promoting European alla franca music appeared in a leading newspaper in 1955 and denotes the social tension around alla turca and alla franca modes:

The fact that we got accustomed to use alla turca coined by Europeans to mean things related to the Turks demonstrates our national sickness of mindless emulation of the Europe clearly.
What will regress us rather than progress is this emulation in language and music. In effect, Turkish classical music is much more beautiful than the alla franca music (Milliyet, Aranizda Munakasa, 12/22/1955, p.5.)

Modernization efforts gained an unprecedented ascendancy with the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Mustafa Kemal, later Ataturk, the founder of the new nation, and his associates were committed to modernization and for them the West was the hallmark of modernity. The modernization effort became so associated with Mustafa Kemal that it is still often referred to as “Kemalism”. When the elements of developmental idealism were strongly endorsed, there were often objections to them by others. These objections were often discounted and reforms were enforced legally, bureaucratically, and, when necessary, militarily (Mango, 2004; Cinar, 2005; Ozdalga, 2005). These changes were a top-down, authoritarian process that were believed to be imperative, as manifested in a 1925 Mustafa Kemal speech:

The civilized world is far ahead of us. We have no choice but to catch up (quoted in Mango, 2004).

In an effort to instill a secular, modern life the country was expected to separate itself from its Ottoman Muslim heritage (Gole, 1996). The emphasis on effacing this heritage stemmed from the belief that there is an inherent discord between tradition and modernity and that religion is a barrier to modernization. In this attempt, such binaries as “old” and “new” or “traditional” and “Western” were readily employed (Kasaba, 1997; p.17). In fact, modernity/Westernization/civilization and, at times, progress were frequently used interchangeably.

Following the rise of Mustafa Kemal and his associates to power, a series of reforms were implemented to foster the “adoption of European norms, attitudes and standards of living” (Mardin, 1991). A comprehensive legal reform included adoption of the Swiss Civil Code (1926) in place of the existing family law and the implementation of the Italian penal code. The Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin alphabet (1928), and the Gregorian calendar, Western measurement system, and Sunday as a weekly public holiday were introduced. A secular educational system with a reformed curriculum designed to spread literacy -with the Latin alphabet- and Kemalist ideas and goals was formulated and
implemented through state-sponsored schools. When national education failed to reach out to rural Anatolia, village institutes were founded as a channel of transformation in the countryside. However, they met considerable resistance from conservative forces because they were coeducational and the new ideas they spread were deemed to have undermined morality, which finally led to their closure (Ahmad, 1993).

The Kemalist elite defined industry and civilization to be synonymous and conceived industrial development and a strong national economy central to their modernization drive (Ahmad, 1993). Many projects were implemented within the first decade of the republic, including the nationalization and expansion of tobacco and cotton industry and establishment of the first national bank. In a very short time an extensive network of railways and roads was constructed. The process of industrialization was set in motion, and by the 1930s several factories had been launched not only in big cities but also in provincial regions of Anatolia.

Gaining Western patterns was the leitmotiv of the reforms. In his 1925 Kastamonu Speech, Mustafa Kemal advocated banning the wearing of robes by the clergy in public (Zurcher, 2005). Western dress for both women and men were supported and previous modes of attire were restricted. The Hat Law of 1925 proscribed the fez (Ottoman hat) and introduced Western style hats. In the words of Zurcher (2005; p.14):

To those who observe Turkey from a far or who visited its towns (but not villages) in the 1920s and 1930s, a spectacular transformation seemed to be taking place that affected not only Turkey’s institutions and its legal system, but also the very way of life of the Turks.

Considerable resistance against reforms and westernization in general took place in both rural and urban areas, leading to cultural clashes and power struggles. Reforms to change many practices in the domestic and cultural areas were considered to be breaches of Islamic values as well as imitating the West. In the 1980s many in the Muslim community countered the official ideology of modernity (Gole, 1996; Cinar, 2005). This movement gained momentum with the rise of political Islam and culminated with the emergence of the Islamic party (Refah Party) in the 1990s, with this clash of cultures continuing to the present. However, it is important to emphasize that despite the resistance to Westernization, the
conservative community in Turkey does not express a stark negation of Western norms and values. Instead, they try to live an alternative lifestyle that is based more on Islamic core values and that incorporates at the same time ideals such as development, economic liberalism, freedom, and democracy (Cinar, 2005), thereby encouraging hybrid forms to take root.

**Family in the Modernity Projects of the Late Ottoman and Early Republican Era**

Since the late Ottoman period, the intelligentsia and political elites have considered the family a central element of the modernization projects. The Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century went through numerous reforms in almost every sphere, but in many ways the family was a backbone of these reforms. Ortaylı, (1994; p.132) wrote “from the Islamic modernists to the liberals, practically all thinkers of the region advocated changes in that classical family structure and in the social status of women”. There were also serious debates, which continue to this day about what path these changes should follow. This led to the dualism of staying faithful to core Islamic values and changing the family by adopting secular, Western norms (Cinar, 2005; Mardin, 2006).

The currency of Western ideas and aspirations brought forth “many issues new to Ottomans such as critique of women’s positions in society and of arranged marriages, development of new family ideal, new domestic manners, and new concerns about children’s place in society and about child rearing” (Duben & Behar, 1991; p.7).

The men of letters described the patriarchal family structure and indigenous marriage practices in a critical way in their literary genres. Parental control over the mating process was frequently mentioned. Some novelists even ridiculed indigenous family practices. *Sair Evlenmesi (The Poet’s Marriage)* by Ibrahim Sinasi, one of the literary figures in the Tanzimat period, is an example of this (see Mardin, 2006).

During the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), the existing family law was criticized. An initial attempt to initiate a new secular family code was made by Mehmet Emin Ali Pasha who suggested adopting the French Civil Code. In response to this proposal, Cevdet Pasha, a leading Ottoman historian and leader of the Islamic party, prepared *Mecelle-i Ahkamı Adliye*, the first codification of Islamic law with Western
standards, but it did not include the subject of the family (Ortaylı, 1994). The *Hukuk-u Aile Kararnamesi*, a secular family law promulgated in 1917, introduced legal changes in marriage, divorce, inheritance, and women’s condition. It also restricted polygyny and forbade marriage before puberty. Moreover, it conferred women some rights in the case of divorce and polygyny, allowing women to divorce under certain circumstances. Importantly, “it brought the family law more into line with European practice” (Zucher, 2005; p.14).

The 1917 law was annulled in 1919, but attempts to seek a modern solution to family matters continued. These efforts, particularly at a time when the Empire was preoccupied with wars and political upheavals, attest to the fact that many elites in the Empire gave strong credence to the belief that “changes in such institutions as marriage, divorce and inheritance mark a transition to a life in a modern state and a modern society” (Ortaylı, 1994). This indicates a state of mind in line with the developmental idealism proposition endorsing the modern family.

When the Empire collapsed and the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, the family received much more attention, and the modernizing drive of the Turkish state manifested itself strongly in the domestic sphere. For Mustafa Kemal the family was “the basis of civilization, the foundation of progress and power”. In 1925 he said:

Gentlemen…I tell you as your own brother, as your friend, as your father that the people of Turkish Republic who claim to be civilized must show and prove that they are civilized by their ideas and their mentality by their family life and their way of living (quoted in Cinar, 2005).

Major legal family reforms were implemented, with the most significant being the adoption of the Swiss civil code in 1926, that aimed at “establishing Western modes of living in place of the Ottoman one” (Cindoglu, Cemrek, Toktas, & Zencirli, 2008). In this civil code, polygyny was banned; minimum ages for marriages (15 for girls and 17 for boys) were established; gender equality in inheritance was enacted; and equal child custody rights for both parents were granted. The reorganization of residential
patterns was encouraged, as reformers of the early Republican period advocated the nuclear family model over extended families that were seen as “traditional” and bad (Sirman, 2007).

Part of the reforms was aimed at changing women’s status. For the state elites, the emancipation of women attested to the level of modernity in the Republic. In this paradigm “women were the bearers of Westernization, carriers of secularization and actresses in public realm” (Gole, 1996; p.14).

Photographs of women unveiled, women in athletic competitions, women pilots, women professionals, and photographs of men and women in European fashion depicted the modernist representations of the prestigious life (Gole, 1996; p.14).

Since women’s autonomy and rights were deemed salient dimensions of a modern society, the Republic of Turkey made great efforts to engage women in social and political life. Women were granted the right to vote and to be elected to offices in 1930 and 1934 respectively. Free secular elementary education was made accessible for women. An unprecedented number of women were recruited into the labor force, both as professionals and as laborers. Increasing education and employment opportunities formed new emancipated women in the urban areas. This emphasis on the role of women is consistent with the ideas of developmental idealism that a modern family is good and that freedom and equality are fundamental rights.

However, the reforms were not evenly spread in the country. Specifically in eastern Anatolia, where the Kurdish population is prevalent, the resistance from conservative groups and ethnic leaders, along with limited schooling opportunities and weak infrastructure were obstacles for the reforms to take root. For a significant number of women in eastern Anatolia, Kurdish and Arabic women in particular, there was an additional disadvantage of being unable to speak Turkish, which not only confined them to the domestic sphere but made them dependent on men (Gunduz-Hosgor & Smith, 2007). Therefore, while modernization reforms promoted urban women’s lives, many in rural settings in eastern Anatolia were not greatly affected by the changes. This geographic variability, to a certain extent, still persists, as many women still cannot speak Turkish and lack certain legal rights (Gunduz-Hosgor & Smith, 2007).
**Efforts to Join the European Union**

For the past four decades integration into the European Union (EU) has been an important driving force that has motivated and facilitated steps toward the adoption of Western norms and standards. Turkey applied to the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the EU, as early as 1959. Becoming an associate member in 1963, Turkey requested full membership in 1987, and in 1999 became an EU candidate state. As of 2001, the Turkish government has carried out numerous reforms required for integration with the EU, implementing more than 30 amendments to its constitution.

Accession to the European Union has been deemed the last step in Turkey’s modernization drive. The constant motif characterizing Turkish modernization has been Westernization, but in contrast to earlier modernization drives, the aspirations associated with the effort to join the EU were shared more broadly, including among different segments of society. Public opinion polls early in the first decade of the 21st century revealed that around 70 percent favored joining the EU (Heper, 2004), but support has recently fallen to around half favoring integration (Eurobarometer Survey, 2008).

**EU and Family Change**

Turkey’s bid for EU membership and the implementation of EU rules has influenced legal regulations on marriage, divorce and gender equality, with several reforms made in Turkish civil and penal codes. The changes included increases in the legal age of marriage to 18, giving children born inside and outside wedlock equal inheritance rights, and allowing single persons to adopt children (Cindoğlu et al., 2008). The civil code that came into effect in 2002 established the full equality of men and women in the family. Women now legally have equal say as to where the family will reside, and they no longer legally have to ask their husbands for permission to be employed. Moreover, the expressions “wife” and “husband” were substituted by the phrase “spouses.” (Women for Women’s Human Rights, WWHR, 2005). Important changes concerned divorce, as the spouses were given equal rights over the family abode and property acquired during marriage. Amendments were implemented in the penal code in 2004 that brought higher sentences for sexual crimes, criminalized marital rape, and eliminated discrimination against non-virgin and unmarried women (WWHR, 2005; pp.14-15).
Turkey’s accession to the EU played a significant role in accelerating change, in part through the EU’s conditionality for candidate countries and through so-called “normative power” (Heper, 2004). Once again the drive to modernize the country had its repercussions in legal views and codes of the family, as the EU reforms pushed the Kemalist program concerning women’s rights to new levels.

Non-legal factors have also prompted changes, including the aspirations of academics and ordinary citizens to “reach European Union standards”—a new catchphrase in the Turkish vernacular. Although we are presenting general discourse among elites, this discourse is likely translated in many ways to ordinary people in everyday life. Family attributes have become an index whereby the country is gauged by European standards. For example, demographers and family scholars sometime compare Turkey’s family structures and population characteristics to those of their European counterparts, highlighting gaps meant to be narrowed. A leading Turkish demographer states that:

A common concern for EU members is how to cope with the high fertility rates in Turkey…This situation might be improved by better services, which might be provided more easily after Turkey becomes a part of EU (Toros, 2002).

For these scholars changing families along Western standards was deemed to be tantamount to changing the society as a whole, again consistent with the belief of developmental idealism that the modern family is good and should be attained. To this end, for instance, rapid rates of population growth in Turkey and the rural nature of the country are seen as impediments to Turkey’s EU integration (Onis, 1999). Also, in line with a belief that rapid population growth would reduce development, some population experts caution against the rate of population growth and the continuing rural nature of Turkey:

The most important indicator of Turkey’s difference from EU countries and the main element that contributes to this differentiation in cause and effect relationship is the rapid population growth rate of Turkey … One way to achieve integration between EU and Turkey can be accomplished through reducing urbanization differences between EU countries and Turkey to a reasonable level by reducing the population growth rate close to EU standards (Erman & Icduygu, 1994; pp. 25-26). (Author’s translation).
In addition to its legal conditionality for the candidate countries, the EU maintains normative power in Turkey, reinforcing the influence of Western ideas on people’s lives. Turkey has a diverse composition with different segments with widely different political interests, but as Inac (2004; p.37) states at least for the apolitical lower and middle classes, the European Union denotes the “more modern, more comfortable and better life expectations”. Moreover, a series of nationwide surveys (Erder, 1994, 1996 and 1998) reveals that the EU means development, economic development in particular, for people in Turkey, therefore, people have high hopes from full membership. The discourses circulating in the Turkish vernacular to follow the West echo within the citizens of the nation the themes of developmental idealism. It is common that when people, elites in particular, face a customary practice they articulate their reaction by juxtaposing the situation to European standards. In this sense when a customary practice like arranged marriage is raised as an issue, the practice is often not denounced on its own merits but by its incompatibility with Western norms. The following criticism from a newspaper commentary illustrates this sentiment. In this commentary the prime minister’s son’s marriage to a 17-year old girl is severely criticized with constant reference to European Union norms:

Turkey is trying to leave behind such old practices as arranged marriage, these days the young are much more open-minded to move beyond this, yet, amid this development how can one account for prime minister’s son’s marriage to a young lady under 18?...On one hand adaptation packages to European Union requirements are going on, reforms are made and laws are passing one by one toward this end, on the other hand, in this very same ground, the prime minister’s son is marrying a 17 year old girl. What type of contradiction is this?

Milliyet/8/9/2003 (Author’s translation)

Family Continuity and Change in Turkey: Adjustment and Hybridity in the Family

We now discuss Turkish family life today and consider the effects of modernity projects since the late Ottoman period. Our purpose is not to describe Turkish family today, but to discuss patterns of change and continuity, consider hybridization of old and new, and note tensions and clashes created by the introduction of developmental idealism. The long ingrained aspirations to modernize Turkish families
along Western standards, the legal reforms implemented since the late Ottoman period, and the ideational motivations behind these reforms undoubtedly had their repercussions on family structure. From its inception, Turkey has gone through substantial changes in marriage, divorce, fertility, gender roles, and parental authority. However, the governmental reforms were always uneven and there was resistance by various groups that, according to a wealth of research, produced a society with both Western lifestyles and Islamic indigenous values (Aykan & Wolf, 2000; Aytaç, 1998; Cindoglu et al., 2008). While there were dramatic changes in various dimensions of family life, the resistance was manifest in persistent customary practices, including bride money, religious wedlock, parental involvement in couples’ lives, and the differentiated and stratified roles of wife and husband.

From one lens, this hybridity is sometimes criticized as a failure, with the government seen as falling short of establishing the reforms evenly across the country and therefore causing old practices to be part of current family behaviors. From another lens, the ensuing family structures are described as an “antagonistic coexistence of different family types” (Nauck & Klaus, 2008). We depict the intertwining of old and new patterns as the outcome of a drive for modernity, balanced by a resistance to that drive. As Thornton (2005; p.239), underscores: “any adoption of developmental idealism involves mixing of indigenous family lives and those of developmental idealism into a hybrid family system”. We contend that the hybrid family patterns are an insignia of people’s agency in modifying modernity and vernacularizing it by practicing it in their own terms. We now discuss some of the changes and continuities that make up Turkey’s ‘hybrid family system’.

*Household Formation*

As noted earlier, in the past extended family living—either in the same yard or under the same roof—was quite common, although it varied across the life course. This household system has changed substantially as nuclear families have gradually predominated. In 1968, nuclear families constituted approximately 60% of Turkish households (Timur, 1972), but today 81% are nuclear families (Turkstat-Family Structure Survey, FSS, 2006). Also, previously it was a cultural and religious norm for adult
children to coreside with older family members to take care of them in their old ages, but recent studies (Aykan & Wolf, 2000; Aytac, 1998) report a notable decline in coresidence.

However, the decline of living together has not destroyed family solidarity. In fact, there has been a compensating trend towards young people living close by older family members (Aytac, 1998), which leads to relationships that Rosenmayr & Köckeis (1963) described as “intimacy at a distance”. Even though they live separately, family members provide material or emotional support to each other, rendering solidarity and social contact very strong. As Vergin, (1985; p.574) states, a person’s social mobility improves the status of all family members, “as the upwardly mobile relative has the duty to come to the aid of the family”. Indeed, this familial support is one of the means of coping with any difficulties emanating from Turkey’s rapid social changes (Vergin, 1985; Cindoglu et al, 2008). Thus, household arrangements assume a hybrid form through many people preferring nuclear family structures, yet maintaining strong family values by perpetuating elements of the old family system.

*Intergenerational Relationships*

As discussed previously, deference towards the elderly and family authority has historically been a strong family value, and young people were expected to show respect to their parents across their entire life courses and to consult with them on important issues (Nauck & Klaus, 2008). The general pattern today is that children’s obedience to parents is a norm, yet this pattern is reversed when children grow up and are expected to take care of their parents during their old ages (Ataca & Sunar, 1999). This fact is further confirmed by evidence from the World Values Survey, which indicates that child obedience is a highly important quality that parents want their children to have. However, this pattern has shifted during the past few decades. Kağıtçıbaşı & Ataca (2005) in their survey found that individuals have been adopting the characteristics of an autonomous-related self “which is different from both the (autonomous) separate self typical of Western individualistic family pattern and (heteronymous) related self typical of the traditional collectivist rural family”. As Vergin (1985; p.574) adroitly summarizes:
Among the upper classes and more particularly among members of the liberal professions, a spirit of camaraderie is developing in the relationship between spouses and in that between child and father, who, influenced through the media by Western and especially American values, no longer see the latter as a distant, inaccessible, omniscient figure to be simultaneously feared and admired.

Despite this shift, parental involvement and control continue as persistent attributes of Turkish families in both urban and rural contexts, leading to a hybrid pattern. In fact, parental involvement across the entire lifetime and the vacillation of this involvement between Turkish and Western dimensions serves as a quintessential example of the coexistence of what is frequently called “modern” and “traditional”. Levine (1982; p.343) illustrates this in the following:

Parents especially middle class ones encourage their children to be modern and independent by giving them the latest fashions in clothes, the most Western books and records, trips to Europe and other advantages. Yet these same parents then undermine these values by continually interfering in their children’s lives.

Interference with children’s lives is manifest in education; parents tend to choose their children’s careers; girls are oriented toward what is described as female careers, such as teaching and nursing, and boys are encouraged to study science and engineering. Getting ahead in a career or pursuing graduate study is not encouraged for girls, as it is believed they might “become unmarriageable“ or their marital happiness will be harmed (Levine, 1982). Also, parental control in couples’ mate selection remains considerable, although it declined considerably the past several decades. According to the most recent Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (2008), 44% of couples marry through arranged marriages, a significant decline from the 74% in the 1959-1968 cohort (Nauck & Klaus, 2008).

Parental involvement continues throughout life, even after the children’s marriages. Turkish parents feel responsible to be involved in their children’s lives and to give them help when needed. They frequently insist that couples should not postpone childbearing and should have at least two children. On occasion, the parents interfere with the couples’ rearing and disciplining of the grandchildren. Parents play
mediator roles in stresses like divorce. Although parental involvement may benefit couples greatly, it can also cause conflict. According to a recent survey of divorced individuals, parents’ interference was reported by 48% to be one important reason behind the couple’s stress, though it was usually not counted as the sole divorce ground (Yurtkuran-Demirkan et al., 2009).

There is also persistence of strong intergenerational ties between mother-in-laws and brides. In Turkey, different historical meanings are attributed to a young woman who is getting married. The word “gelin”, the noun to mean bride still used in Turkish today, is derived from the Turkish verb “gel” meaning “to come” in English. So “bride”/“gelin” is someone who comes to the family, leading people in the new family to think that they control the bride (Yurtkuran-Demirkan et al., 2009; p.82). In a rural setting, characterized as ‘classical patriarchy’ (Kandiyoti, 1988), the young ‘coming’ woman is subordinate to all men and senior women in the new family. Senior women exert control over the young bride responding to the patriarchal male control they themselves lived through:

In classical patriarchy, subordination to men is offset by the control older women attain over younger women. However women have access to the only type of labor power they can control, and to old-age security, through their married sons… Older women have a vested interest in the suppression of romantic love between youngsters to keep the conjugal bond secondary and to claim son’s primary allegiance (Kandiyoti, 1988; p.279).

To a certain extent, what Kandiyoti analyzed in rural settings still remains in urban contexts as well. Regardless of her socio-economic status, a woman is expected to show a strong deference to her mother-in-law, to convince her that she is good enough to take care of her son and grandchildren, and to pay frequent visits to her and help with household chores during each visit.

**Family Formation Behaviors**

In Turkey marriage continues to be very pervasive, as the majority (65 percent) of women of childbearing age are currently married (TDHS, 2008). However, whereas age at first marriage in the 19th century was 14-18 for women and 20-22 for men, it has risen so much that it is now around 26 for men
and 23 for women (Turkstat, 2010). Note that geographic variability exists, as early marriage is still a norm in rural areas in Eastern Anatolia. For example, it is common for rural women to get married before age 16 (Gunduz-Hosgor & Smith, 2007). There is also a shift in the meaning of marriage. Previously, parents had the authority to determine when and whom their children married, but today marriage is increasingly defined in line with developmental idealism. That is, affection, love, and companionship are becoming central elements of mate selection in urban Turkey. For instance, as the Turkstat-Family Structure Survey (2006) delineated, among unmarried young men and women, 90% of both men and women stated love as an important element in their choice of marriage partners. The joint occurrence of old and new practices is also manifest through such things as giving bride money to the bride’s father before marriage. As previously stated, it was quite pervasive in the past, and currently the rate of families paying bride price is 17%, being practiced mostly in rural Anatolia (Turkstat-FSS, 2006).

Wedding ceremonies constitute another example of a hybrid family system in Turkey. Religious weddings that occurred during the Ottoman Empire were officially eliminated with the adoption of the Swiss Civil code in 1926. However, despite the state’s insistence that civil ceremonies be performed at the registry office, a large part of the population, especially in the eastern part of the country, have maintained religious weddings. Currently, according to the Turkstat-Family Structure Survey (2006), 87% of couples are married through both civil and religious ceremonies, and only 7% have a religious ceremony without a civil ceremony. Although, even Islamic scholars caution against the validity of religious rites alone because the existing legal system does not recognize religious rites, couples continue to have religious ceremonies for religious sensitivity or out of conforming to the old ways.

The celebrations accompanying weddings are another example of combining what is called modern and traditional practices in family rituals. In both urban and rural Turkey, weddings often entail extravagant expenditures. A wedding ceremony usually lasts for at least three days, comprising such events as the groom's parents’ visit to the bride's side with several elderly and respected members of the family to ask for the bride’s hand from her father, which is celebrated with Turkish coffee made and
served by the prospective bride. An engagement ceremony is usually held shortly afterward for the groom to place an engagement ring on the bride's finger. There is also shopping for the bride and bridegroom and the historical henna party where the bride and her female friends dress in heavily embroidered velvet dresses, usually red in color, dance around the bride with a tray of henna in their hands, place henna along with a gold coin (believed to bring good luck) on the bride’s palms, and sing sad songs to make the bride cry, which ironically symbolizes her would-be happiness. The official ceremony and the main wedding reception where the newly-wed couple receives their wedding gifts occur afterwards.

Although Turkish wedding ceremonies still maintain many indigenous elements, Western elements are gaining ground, particularly in urban areas. Examples include couples cutting a wedding cake together at the wedding party, staying at a hotel for the wedding night, and going on a honeymoon. Also important is the bride’s white wedding dress, a fashion that was first introduced at the Ottoman palace in 1898, with the wedding of the sultan’s daughter. This fashion gradually spread throughout Turkish society and came to be the predominant pattern both in rural and urban contexts. Before then, wedding dresses were made of rich fabrics and ornaments in the style of the time and were in different colors like red, purple, blue, or pink.

The crude divorce rate increased from 0.15 in 1930 to 0.37 in 1961. It fluctuated between 0.46 and 0.52 during the 1990s and then increased to 1.59 in 2009 (Turkstat, 2010). The grounds for divorce also changed, with increasing emphasis on democratic relationships and emotional gratification (Yurtkuran-Demirkan, Ersoz, Sen, Ertekin, Sezgin, Turgut & Sehitoglu, 2009; Demircioglu, 2000). The mismatch between expectations and fulfillments has become a significant rationale for recent divorces, challenging the historical norm where husband and wife were expected to keep the marriage intact regardless of stress and conflict. For the most part, divorce grounds are described as incompatibility. Court records indicate that this includes 95% of all the divorces. A recent survey (Yurtkuran-Demirkan et al., 2009) reveals a lack of communications between couples (69%) as one of the major reasons leading to
divorce, and another study (Demircioglu, 2000) found irreconcilable personality differences and mismatch between expectations and fulfillments as major grounds for marital breakup.

There is a strong interplay between changing gender roles and marital conflict. Cultural ideology prompts men and women to live up to certain sex roles such as men being financially independent and protective and women being compliant and dependent. Moreover, there is a tendency to hold women responsible for a failing marriage. So, upon divorce, women are blamed for not having preserved the marriage and for causing moral decay in society. The cultural emphasis on keeping the marriage together is manifested in the Turkish vernacular with such sayings as “a good woman is a sacrificial mother for her family” (kadın dediğin ailesi için saçını süpürge eder) and “a good woman keeps her man” (kadın dediğin kocasını elinde tutar). By getting divorced on the grounds of unhappiness or a lack of fulfillment, couples, women in particular, present behaviors counter to the cultural ideology. We argue that ideational factors often challenge and complicate these role boundaries, which leave people with confusion that potentially sets the stage for conflict (see Levine, 1982).

**Fertility**

A dramatic fertility decline has been underway for several decades. There has been a steady decline from 7.1 children per woman in 1930, to 4.3 in 1978, to 3.1 during the late 1980s, and to 2.2 in 2008. There is geographical variability ranging from a high of 3.3 births in the east to a low of 1.7 births in the west (TDHS, 2008). Declines in desired fertility have given rise to a two-child norm. According to the recent Turkish Demographic and Health Survey, the desire for several children has declined noticeably. Among women who have two living children, 72% want no more children. Another important change is the postponement of first births, which is in line with delays in marriage.

Government population policies, pronatalist up until the 1960s and anti-natalist thereafter, may have influenced fertility change in Turkey (Turkish Fertility Survey, 1978). The Turkish government
initiated family planning programs after 1965, aiming at controlling population growth by encouraging contraception and establishing family planning agencies across the country. Contraceptive use is now widespread, with 91 percent of ever-married women having used a contraceptive method at some time during their reproductive years (TDHS, 2008). Although there is opposition to the present two-child norm from conservative Muslim communities, the steady decline continues. It is difficult to pin down the motivations behind the fertility decline, but it is likely that both structural and ideational factors, including the idea that controlling population growth will help achieve development, have been operating.

*Sex Roles*

Current sex roles also involve an interplay between the historical and the new. As noted earlier, high regard for women’s status and rights has been an important element of the Republican modernity project, which encouraged women’s empowerment through access to education, employment and politics. Sex roles have moved toward less male domination and more egalitarian attitudes and relationships in the family (Kagitcibasi, 1986; Imamoglu, 1994; Ataca & Sunar, 1999; Vergin, 1985). However, gender inequality has not been eliminated. While Kemalist reforms have made significant achievements among middle-and upper-class families in urban areas, their influence has been only partial among lower socioeconomic groups and in the eastern rural areas (Nauck and Klaus, 2008; Gunduz-Hosgor & Smits, 2007). Today, while spousal relations are changing toward less domination by the husband and greater involvement of the wife in decision-making (Ataca & Sunar 1999), some conflicting gender roles still exist (see Kandiyoti, 1995). Although discourses about gender equality and women’s rights are pervasive, in most cases, marital negotiations continue to be molded in long-standing ways (Bolak, 1997). That is, women are still usually in charge of household chores and childcare regardless of their employment status. A study by Ataca and Sunar (1999) lends support to the view that while women in urban families now entertain relatively more freedom and participate more in decision-making, both men and women report that important decisions are usually made by the husband.
Employed women’s contributions to family finances are another example of joint occurrences of old and new practices. Women’s employment in urban settings—at least in principle—is affirmed and the old view that even if they have education, women should stay at home is disparaged as not conforming to the present day Turkey, which is “on the course of integration to the European Union”, as the common discourse puts it. Moreover, according to the recent Turkstat- Family Structure Survey, 74% of men endorse women’s employment. Yet, when it comes to the wife’s earnings, it is evaluated as additional earnings, and the discourse of the husband being the head of the family is still perpetuated.

As Kandiyoti (1995) portrays, while male dominance was redefined and renegotiated with some variations according to geography and socioeconomic status, Turkey became a country where a number of different gender regimes in the family coexisted. This seemingly contradictory pattern leads people to “act one moment as an egalitarian, liberal and the next like a chauvinistic, conservative forming the basis of many conflicts in marriage” (Levine, 1982; p.338). We argue that this mixture of egalitarianism and inegalitarianism is the result of people’s responses to ideational changes.

Conclusion

We have used the developmental idealism framework for understanding many decades of family change in Turkey. We argue that throughout most of the 19th and 20th centuries many elites in Turkey implemented programs to modernize the country that included many elements of developmental idealism. Working with the belief that a modern society is good and should be attained, they implemented programs of educational expansion, curriculum reform, industrialization, economic expansion, legal reform, modifications of social customs, and the improvement of communication and transportation networks. Motivated by the beliefs that modern families are good and facilitate the achievement of a modern society, these reformers worked to modify family structures and relationships away from historical Turkish patterns towards those valued by developmental idealism. Operating over the course of two centuries, these modernization efforts have been met with considerable opposition, tension, and clashes of culture, as some forms of the Western lifestyle identified as modern or progressive were very foreign, even heretical,
to many people and thus were rejected by them. This resistance has led to coexistence of what is described as modern (e.g., European) and traditional (e.g., indigenous) family patterns, resulting in the hybridization of developmental idealism with indigenous patterns of family life.

The strong aspirations and reforms implemented to change family behaviors along the lines prevailing in the West have been accompanied by numerous and substantial changes in age at marriage, how marriages are arranged, the meaning of marriage, divorce, intergenerational relations, living arrangements, sex roles, and fertility. Just as important, however, is that some old family practices persisted and intertwined with Western life styles. We can see reverberations of this phenomenon in family formation behaviors, intergenerational relationships, sex roles, and family rituals like wedding practices. People seemed to accommodate some elements of indigenous and Western family forms, though the intensity of this emerging hybrid structure may differ by urban and rural residence, geographical region, social position, individual experiences, and the level of exposure to new ideas.

Our argument is that developmental idealism has operated through many mechanisms to affect family change. Of particular importance is that developmental idealism’s idea that a modern society is good and should be attained led Turkey’s elite to advocate for and initiate societal innovations considered to be modern, including the expansion of educational institutions, industrialization of the country, which led to urbanization and economic expansion, and the creation of mass media outlets. Such changes may have helped foster changes in family beliefs, values, relationships, and behavior. They also served as mechanisms for the spread of developmental idealism messages. This drive also included campaigns to implement developmental idealism through speeches, educational programs, and legal reforms.

The mechanisms for spreading and implementing developmental idealism to the grassroots are thus complex and multi-faceted. For example, the efforts of reformers to modernize Turkish society led to the separation of work from family and to the expansion of the educational attainment of children, which expose people to new values and norms. Since the modernization efforts for many decades also fostered Western values and standards as government policy, these new values and norms by definition represent Western beliefs and values. Thus, the spread of developmental idealism involves a mixture of
developmental idealism as a causal force that changes society, which, in turn, both changes values and relationships and serves as a mechanism for further spread of developmental idealism.

As a further example we note that increased education and industrialization are often cited as the main driving forces for love marriages and the movement towards more gender egalitarianism (Cindoglu, et al., 2008; Imamoglu, 1994; Kagitcibasi, 1986). However, it is important to emphasize the role of ideational influences since education and urbanization increase exposure to Western ideals of a modern family involving couple initiated marriages at later ages and higher status of women. Such ideas have been widely circulated through the media, affecting people’s vision of an ideal marriage. It is highly probable that as knowledge of western family practices and relationships circulates widely in the country, people are consciously or subconsciously influenced, leading to the questioning of old ways and positively considering new options. We also reiterate that the idea of a modern society being good and attainable was a major force in producing the industrialization and education that are seen as driving forces in changing marriage and gender relations.

It is important to emphasize that our conceptualization of developmental idealism and its place in changing Turkish society dramatically alters the causal structure usually perceived by social scientists in that it places a system of beliefs and values in the role of an exogenous force rather than a product of other forces said to be exogenous. It was a commitment to modernization that brought to Turkey schools, factories, urbanization, income growth, mass media, and new forms of family life. In addition, the new institutions created by developmental idealism formed important pathways for the further spread of developmental idealism—all with implications for family behavior. Understanding this exogenous role of developmental idealism is crucial for understanding family change and continuity in Turkey.

A caveat at this juncture is that it is highly difficult to establish causation “when many explanatory factors are changing simultaneously and when reliable data for the period before the changes are in short supply” (Thornton & Philipov, 2009; p.151). With this caveat in mind, however, the results of our analyses lead us to the conclusion that the modification of Western norms and the resulting hybridity can be thought of as vernacularization of modern family forms in Turkey, attesting to the fact that
developmental idealism has had a substantial influence in the Turkish setting. We expect that developmental idealism will continue to affect Turkish families in the future and that hybridization will continue to characterize family life.

We also note that we have focused on one particular ideational force, developmental idealism, as a motivator of family change. We have done so because the importance of developmental idealism has not been sufficiently acknowledged and understood. However, this decision does not mean that we suggest that all family changes are due to developmental idealism. Also, we are not supporting or rejecting the beliefs and values of developmental idealism themselves. We simply argue that developmental idealism has spread widely across Turkey, has been accepted by many government and non-government organizations, community leaders, families, and individuals, and has become an influential force for changing family behavior, beliefs, and values.

We close by reiterating that the scope of our project covering long periods of Turkish history and the shortages of data have made it impossible to document empirically many of the dimensions of Turkey’s modernization programs, the mechanisms for the transmission of ideas, and the trends in beliefs and values. We advocate for further research in Turkey to further understand the ways that developmental idealism and other factors have led to change, continuity, and hybridization in Turkish family patterns. Research on similar issues in other settings would also be valuable.

References


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